The foreign landscape of British politics

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Pass -Me The Yeats, old. “The center cannot stand”; “Everything changed, it changed completely.” The victory of Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom’s reform in the English local elections last week has divided the punctures among the poetic hyperbole of those who see the end of politics as we knew and the condescension of bading of those who insist things will probably return to the average.

No one can deny the disorder. Since Brexit, the policy of the United Kingdom has become more European. The support for the main parties has disappeared. There is a carefree government and an unprocessed opposition. Voters have been attracted to various directions and, above all, Britain has acquired its own populist nationalist force.

The United Kingdom has seen moments of several parties earlier. But in the last general election, combined support for work and the Tories dropped from 82 percent in 2017 to 57 percent. Last week was almost not above a third. This feels more than a blip.

It is simply too soon to say if the recent results reflect a permanent alteration of political architecture or simply a flow period as the existing Duopoly changes character: new facts or new furniture. But the main parties must work in an alien landscape, where ancient certainties are being eroded.

One of the popular troops is that we attend at the end of the politics of two parties. The reform is beating the conservatives as Labour’s vote flows to the left. But, although the promotion of Farage threatens the status quo, it is unclear if the British 100 -year -old duopoli is irreparable or in a state of transition from a pre -eminent force to the right to another.

The United Kingdom is undoubtedly right -wing (although reform defies such an easy classification) around immigration policy and nativism, a pattern comparable to that of many western countries. The Tories had already moved significantly in this regard. Whether they are replaced by the reform, they recover or, finally, according to some form of pact, in one way or another the probable final state is a single dominant entity.

One of the differences is that, in the words of a higher work figure, “the opposition agenda is no longer fixed by the official opposition”. For the first time in modern memory, the most energetic opposition movement is largely outside Parliament, the county councils and the mayor’s office and the discourse established on social networks. In the 1980’s there was a municipal opposition in Thatcherism, but under the wide labor umbrella. There are advantages and cons of Farage. It will be difficult to control their new regional legions that have excessive potential and ashamed. However, this base outside of London changes the character of the debate and adds to the meaning of an foreign movement, which challenges the establishment. For this reason, the reform is already establishing the agenda of the two main parties.

Then there is the changing impact of the first electoral system in the United Kingdom. This has traditionally acted as a bastion against insurgents, which is why the reform has supported a change. Includes new parties: unless they are very effective in local orientation, they must secure a vote fee about 30 percent before they enjoy a significant parliamentary breakthrough. However, if a part may comply with this high roof, the system suddenly works for the benefit, achieving hundreds of profit and detrimental profit by the holders of the holders. Last week, the reform reached these levels.

The existing electoral system still militates against the policy of several long -term parties. New festivals reflect a gap in the market. The established parts work to close this gap, but they also change a character to do it. The work could also be found under pressure to protect its left flank.

The navigation of this new landscape is further complicated by a larger strategic issue. Historically, the election wins by occupying the center of the center. But the center is changing. The Orthodox Economy and progressive social policy now consider that many voters have failed. The rearrangement on the right comes from this electoral change. In contrast, the new median position is a mix of social conservatism and a more leftist interventionist economy, as evidenced by the broad support for nationalizing British steel.

This change raises two problems. The first is whether there is still the electoral space for two important parts of the traditional half -running, a strong center on the left and center to the right, or if, as in most of the EU, this space can now support only an important part.

The second is whether both sides still want this territory of the Liberal Center. Conservatives and reform have largely abandoned it. If there is only room for a dominant party in this space, the work (slightly pro-European, politically liberal, fiscal, prudent) is currently better located to occupy it.

But labor also seeks to reform voters. It is identified as the voice of Minorism, not the party of globalization and is struggling to maintain a successful coalition of liberals and fewer workers. He also fears that the fragmentation of his vote on the left, especially the Greens. A great tent is not necessarily the advantage it was.

It is possible to see the routes again to normal (implosion of reform, labor recovery, conservative revival). But the ancient strategic certainties dissolve. Part of the success of reform so far is that it has been faster to have an idea of ​​the new election landscape. In the meantime, the two great British looks like tourists in a foreign country.

Robert.shrimsley@ft.com